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Dual Antenna Selection in Secure Cognitive Radio
Networks
Gaojie Chen, Yu Gong, Member, IEEE, Pei Xiao, Senior Member, IEEE
and Jonathon Chambers, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This paper investigates data transmission and physi-
cal layer secrecy in cognitive radio network. We propose to apply
full duplex transmission and dual antenna selection at secondary
destination node. With the full duplex transmission, the sec-
ondary destination node can simultaneously apply the receiving
and jamming antenna selection to improve the secondary data
transmission and primary secrecy performance respectively. This
describes an attractive scheme in practice: unlike that in most
existing approaches, the secrecy performance improvement in the
CR network is no longer at the price of the data transmission
loss. The outage probabilities for both the data transmission and
physical layer secrecy are analyzed. Numerical simulations are
also included to verify the performance of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Physical layer secrecy, cognitive radio network,
antenna selection, full duplex
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) improves spectrum utilization by shar-
ing resources between primary and cognitive radio (secondary)
users. Among various spectrum sharing schemes including
underlay, overlay and interweave, the underlay scheme is often
of interest in practical implementation [1]. In the underlay
approach, the secondary user is allowed to access the spectrum
of the primary user if its interference to the primary user is
below a certain level. It is known that the antenna selection
provides an attractive approach in the underlay CR network
[2]–[4]. In the CR antenna selection schemes, the ‘best’
antenna with the least interference to the primary users and
strongest link for the secondary data transmission is often
selected among a number of available antennas equipped at
the secondary users.
An important issue that has attracted much attention recently
is the physical layer network security in the CR system.
Unlike the traditional cryptographic security system [5], the
physical network security is based on Shannon theory using
channel coding to achieve secure transmission [6]–[11]. The
physical layer security has been investigated in various sys-
tems including direct point-to-point transmission (e.g. [12]),
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distributed beamforming in cooperative networks (e.g. [13],
[14]), cooperative jamming (e.g. [15]–[17]), relay and jammer
selection (e.g. [18]–[20]) and buffer aided relay network [21].
The physical layer secrecy is of particularly interest in
the CR network. This is because that the primary users are
designed to share the spectrum with secondary users, making it
also ‘convenient’ for eavesdroppers to intercept the informative
data. In [22], the secondary source is used as a jammer to
improve the secrecy performance of the primary network. This
is not a typical CR network as the secondary user does not
transmit its own data. In [23], a CR network with multiple
secondary users is considered, where the secondary user which
maximizes the secrecy performance of the secondary network
is selected for data transmission. In [24], transmission powers
are carefully allocated between the primary and secondary
users to balance the primary and secondary secrecy rates.
Similarly in [25], powers are optimally allocated to maximize
the secrecy rate in a MIMO cognitive network, which is
achieved with distributed beamforming at the source or the
relay. All of these approaches mainly focus on the physical
layer secrecy in the CR network. This motives us to investigate
approaches which can improve the physical layer secrecy and
data transmission at the same time.
In this paper, we propose a dual antenna selection to
improve data transmission in the secondary network and
secrecy performance in the primary network simultaneously.
This is achieved by equipping full duplex multiple antennas
at the secondary destination. Full duplex transmission, which
was previously considered difficult to implement due to the
associated self interference, is now an attractive alternative in
many applications because of the recent advances in the fields
of antenna technology and signal processing [26]–[28]. In this
paper, the receiving antenna selection at the secondary destina-
tion node is used to maximize the data transmission capacity
in the secondary network. On the other hand, because of the
full duplex transmission, the transmission antenna selection is
also used at the secondary destination to transmit jamming
signals to the eavesdropper so that the secrecy capacity of
the primary network is improved. With the full-duplex dual
antenna selection at the secondary destination, unlike existing
approaches, the secrecy and data transmission performance no
longer have to compromise for each other but can be improved
simultaneously. This describes a new way in applying full-
duplex (beside its capability in increasing data rate), which is
of particular interest in 5G applications including CR network,
D2D transmission and small cell systems.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
2follows:
 Proposing the full duplex dual antenna selection scheme
to improve the data transmission for the secondary net-
work and secrecy performance for the primary network
simultaneously. Both cases with and without the knowl-
edge of the jamming channel gains are considered. As
far as the authors are aware, this is the first attempt to
simultaneously improve the secrecy and data transmission
in the CR network.
 Deriving the closed-form expressions the outage proba-
bility for the secondary data transmission. The analysis
shows that the receiving antenna selection provides di-
versity gain in the secondary data transmission.
 Deriving the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy
outage probability for the primary network. The analysis
shows that, even without the knowledge of the jamming
channel gains, the jamming antenna selection can still
improve the secrecy performance of the primary network.
 Analyzing the secrecy diversity order and coding gain
for the primary network, and concluding that the secrecy
performance improvement from the jamming antenna
selection comes from the coding gain rather than the
diversity gain. This is very different from the traditional
antenna selection schemes for data transmission, where
the performance gain is mainly from the diversity gain.
The results provide very useful insight in designing
practical secrecy systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes the dual antenna selection schemes; Section III
analyzes the outage probability for the secondary data trans-
mission; Section IV derives the upper and lower bounds of the
secrecy outage probability for the primary network; Section
V analyzes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain for
the primary network; Section VI verifies the proposed antenna
selection scheme with numerical simulations; finally Section
VII summarizes the paper.
II. DUAL ANTENNA SELECTION AT THE SECONDARY
DESTINATION
The system model of the secure cognitive network is shown
in Fig. 1, which consists of the primary network (including
one primary source node PS and one primary destination
PD), the secondary network (including one secondary source
node SS and one secondary destination node SD), and one
eavesdropper E. The secondary destination SD performs in
the full duplex mode, and is equipped with multiple antennas,
where there are K1 antennas for receiving data from the
secondary source and K2 antennas for transmitting jamming
signals to the eavesdropper. All other nodes are equipped
with a single antenna and perform in the half duplex mode.
We denote SDi and SDj as the ith and jth receiving and
jamming antennas at node SD, where i = 1;    ;K1 and
j = 1;    ;K2, respectively. As is illustrated in Fig. 1, the
channel coefficients for SS ! SDi, SS ! E, SS ! PD,
SDj ! PD, SDj ! E, PS ! SDi, PS ! PD, PS ! E
and SDj ! SDi are denoted as hsdi , hse, hsp, hdjp, hdje,
hpdi , hpp, hpe and hdjdi , respectively.
Fig. 1. Dual antenna selection in the secure CR network.
The channel gains are denoted as ab = jhabj2
correspondingly, which are independently exponentially
distributed with mean of ab = E[jhabj]2, where
ab 2 fsdi; se; sp; djp; dje; pdi; pp; pe; djdig. We assume that
sdi = sd, pdi = pd, djp = dp and dje = de, for all
i = 1;    ;K1 and j = 1;    ;K2.
Without losing generality, we assume the transmission
power at PS and noise variances are all normalized to
unity, and the channels are quasi-static so that the channel
coefficients remain unchanged during one packet duration but
independently vary from one packet time to another. We also
assume the secondary users have knowledge of the channel-
state-information (CSI) between the secondary and primary
users. This can be achieved by feeding back CSI from the
primary user to the secondary transmitter directly or indirectly
by, for example, a band manager between the two parties [29],
or sensing pilot signals from primary users [30].
A. Receiving antenna selection
The receiving antenna is selected with the best data trans-
mission performance in the secondary network. Because the
secondary destination SD operates in full-duplex mode, it
receives data from the secondary source SS and transmit
jamming signals to the eavesdropper E at the same time. If
the jth jamming antenna SDj is selected, the received signal
at the ith receiving antenna SDi is given by
ysdi =
p
Psshsdiss + hpdisp +
p
Psdhdjdist + nsdi ; (1)
where ss, sp and st are the transmission signals from nodes
SS, PS and the SDj respectively, Pss and Psd are the
transmission powers at SS and SD respectively. It is clear
that third term at the right hand side of (1) is the residual
self-interference from the SDj to SDi.
Then the capacity for data receiving at SDi is given by
Csd;i = log2

1 +
Psssdi
pdi + Psddidi + 1

: (2)
Considering that current technology can significantly sup-
press the self interference to the noise level (e.g [31], [32]),
we assume that residual self-interference term Psddidi has
little effect on Csd;i. Further assuming the channel SNR is
3high enough, we approximately have
Csd;i  log2

1 +
Psssdi
pdi

: (3)
In the underlay CR system, the interfering power from the
secondary network to the primary destination must be below
a certain level. Similar to those in [23], [33], the transmission
powers of SS and SD can be constrained as Psssp  Ith
and Psddjp  Ith respectively. Then replacing Pss in (3)
with Ith=sp gives
Csd;i  log2

1 +
Ith
sp
 sdi
pdi

: (4)
Thus we propose that the receiving antenna at the secondary
destination SD is selected maximizing (4) such that
ir = arg max
i=1; ;K1

sdi
pdi

: (5)
B. Jamming antenna selection
The jamming antenna is selected with the best secrecy
performance in the primary network. Below we first derive
the secrecy capacity for the primary network, from which the
jamming selection rules are proposed.
1) Data transmission capacity at PD: Because the sec-
ondary destination SD performs in the full duplex mode,
the secondary source SS transmits data and SD transmits
jamming signals at the same time. Thus both SS and SD
impose interference to the primary destination PD. If the jth
antenna SDj is selected, the received signal at PD is given
by
ypd;j = hppsp +
p
Psshspss +
p
Psdhdjpst + npd; (6)
where npd is the noise at node PD. Then the capacity for data
transmission at PD is obtained as
Cd;j = log2

1 +
pp
Psssp + Psddip + 1

: (7)
Using the CR power constraints in (7), we have
Cd = log2

1 +
pp
2Ith + 1

 log2

pp
2Ith + 1

; (8)
where the approximation holds at high SNR, and the jamming
antenna index j is ignored because (8) holds for every SDj .
We note that it is common to assume high SNR in the physical
layer secrecy systems to focus on the secrecy performance (e.g.
[18], [21]).
2) Eavesdropping capacity at E: Due to the full-duplex
transmission at SD, the eavesdropper receives signals from
PS, SS and SD simultaneously. If jth jamming antenna SDj
is selected, the received signal at the eavesdropper E is given
by
ye;j = hpesp +
p
Psshsess +
p
Psdhdjest + ne; (9)
where ne is the noise at the eavesdropper E.
While the jamming signal st imposes interference on the
eavesdropper E, the transmission from PS and SS forms an
multiple-access channel at E. But unlike the typical multiple-
access channel, for the secrecy performance of the primary
network, the eavesdropper intends to ‘intercept’ the data from
the primary source PS (and not that from the secondary source
SS). Therefore, the eavesdropping capacity for the primary
data sp detection is a piece-wise function of the SS ! E
channel gain se as is shown in the following. We suppose
the data rate of the secondary source SS is Rdata.
 If log2(1+
Pssse
Psddje+1
) < Rdata, the SS ! E channel is
too weak for the eavesdropper to decode the secondary
data ss, so that ss can only be treated as interference.
Then the eavesdropping capacity for the primary network
is obtained as
Ce;j = log2

1 +
pe
Pssse + Psddje + 1

;
if Pssse < (2
Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1):
(10)
 If log2(1 +
Pssse
pe+Psddje+1
) < Rdata < log2(1 +
Pssse
Psddje+1
), the eavesdropper can jointly decode the data
from PS and SS. Considering that SS transmits at
rate Rdata, the eavesdropping capacity for the primary
network is obtained as
Ce;j = log2

1 +
pe + Pssse
Psddje + 1

 Rdata;
if (2Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1) < Pssse <
(2Rdata   1)(pe + Psddje + 1):
(11)
where the first term at the right-hand-of (11) is the
‘overall’ capacity for the sp and ss detection.
 If log2(1 +
Pssse
pe+Psddje+1
) > Rdata, the SS ! E
channel is strong enough for the eavesdropper to decode
ss first (by treating sp as interference). The eavesdropper
then subtracts the ss term from its received signal (which
is given by (9)), and decodes sp. Then the eavesdropping
capacity for the primary network is obtained as if there
is no SS transmission as
Ce;j = log2

1 +
pe
Psddje + 1

;
if Pssse > (2
Rdata   1)(pe + Psddje + 1):
(12)
3) Secrecy capacity: If the j jamming antenna SDj is
selected, the secrecy capacity ( [8]) in the primary network
is obtained as
Cs;j = [Cd   Ce;j ]+; (13)
where [a]+ = max(a; 0).
It is clear from (13) that, in order to have large secrecy
capacity, the jamming antenna at the secondary destination
need to be selected corresponding to large data transmission
capacity Cd at PD and small eavesdropping capacity Ce;j at
E. Or the selected antenna has high ‘jamming’ to E and low
‘interference’ to PD. This again requires large jhdjej2 and
small jhdjpj2, as is shown in (7) and (10-12), respectively.
Thus we propose to select the jamming antenna with the
largest ratio of dje=djp. In fact, as will be shown later in (25)
and (26), this jamming antenna selection scheme maximizes
the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity.
44) Jamming antenna selection rules: We assume that the
secondary destination SD is aware of the SDj ! PD channel
gains djp. Then depending on the knowledge of the SDj !
E jamming channel gains, we propose two jamming antenna
selection rules:
Case 1 - If the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming
channel gains is available, the jamming antenna is selected
to satisfy
jcase 1 = arg max
j=1; ;K2

dje
djp

: (14)
Case 2 - If the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming
channel gains is not available (which is often the case in
practice), the jamming antenna is selected to satisfy
jcase 2 = arg max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp

: (15)
Below, we drive the outage probabilities for the data trans-
mission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in
the primary network.
III. OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE SECONDARY DATA
TRANSMISSION
This section analyzes the outage probability of the data
transmission in the secondary network. If the ith receiving
antenna SDi is selected at the secondary destination, the
data transmission capacity in the secondary network is given
by (4) when the channel SNR is high enough. Because the
receiving antenna is selected from K1 antennas, and from (5),
the capacity for the data transmission is approximately given
by
Csd  log2
0B@1 + Ith  maxi=1; ;K1

sdi
pdi

sp
1CA : (16)
The outage probability for data transmission in the secondary
network is then given by
Pd;out = P (Csd < Rdata); (17)
where Rdata is the data rate at the secondary source SS.
Substituting (16) into (17) and letting X1 =
max
i=1; ;K1

sdi
pdi

, Y1 = sp, Z1 = X1=Y1 and z1 = 2
Rdata 1
Ith
,
we have
Pd;out = FZ1(z1) = P (X1=Y1 < z1)
=
Z 1
0
FX1(z1y1)fY1(y1)dy1;
(18)
where F (:) is the cumulative density function (CDF).
The CDF of X1 and probability density function (PDF) of
Y1 can be obtained as
FX1(x1) =

x1
N + x1
K1
and fY1(y1) =
1
sp
e
  y1sp ; (19)
respectively, where N = sd=pd.
Finally, substituting (19) into (18) gives
Pd;out =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1  Nspz1 e
N
spz1 Ei(1; Nspz1 );
if K1 = 1;
spz1
N
K1 1 MG[[0];[ ]];[[K1 1;K1];[ ]]; Nspz1 
 (K1)
;
if K1  2;
(20)
where Ei(1; a) =
R1
1
exp( ta)
a dt; a > 0,  () is the gamma
function, andMG ([[ ]; [ ]]; [[; ]; [ ]]; ) is the Meijer G func-
tion [34].
It is clear from (20) that the outage probability Ps;out
well depends on N , or a larger N leads to smaller outage
probability. It is thus of interest to show the diversity order
for the data transmission in the secondary network which is
defined as
dd =   lim
N!1
log10 Pd;out
log10N
: (21)
We note that the definition in (21) is similar to that of the
conventional diversity order except now the SNR is replaced
with the parameter N . The diversity order defined in (21)
reflects the decreasing rate of Ps;out with respect to the
receiving antenna number K1.
Unfortunately, because (20) contains the Meijer G function
MG(:), it is very hard to derive the diversity order. On the
other hand, numerical results show thatMG(:) has little effect
on the diversity order. Then ignoring the MG(:) term in (20),
we approximately have
dd    lim
N!1
log10(spz1=N)
K1 1
log10N
= K1   1; K1  2:
(22)
This shows that the receiving antenna selection introduces
diversity gain in the data transmission, which is similar to that
in the traditional antenna selection schemes [4]. This result
will be verified in the simulation later.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE PRIMARY
NETWORK
This section analyzes the secrecy outage probability of the
primary networks. Both Case 1 and 2, with and without the
knowledge of the jamming channel gains respectively, are con-
sidered. Because the eavesdropping capacity is a complicated
piece-wise function as is shown in (10-12), it is hard (if not
impossible) to obtain the closed form expression of secrecy
outage probability for the primary network. Instead, the upper
and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability are derived.
First, the maximum eavesdropping capacity for the primary
source Ce;j is obtained when the signals from SS has no effect
on the eavesdropper to detect the data from PS. This happens
when se = 0, or Pssse > (2Rdata 1)(pe+Psddje+1) so
that the SS ! E link is strong enough for the eavesdropper
to successfully decode ss and subtract it from the received
signal. Thus when jth jamming antenna is selected, the upper
bound of the eavesdropping capacity is given by
C
(up)
e;j = log2

1 +
pe
Psddje + 1

: (23)
5On the other hand, we notice that when log(1 +
Pssse
Psddje+1
) < Rdata, or Pssse < (2Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1),
the eavesdropper cannot decode ss so that the signals from
SS is treated as interference. When Pssse > (2Rdata  
1)(Psddje+1), ss and sp (from SS and PS respectively) can
be jointly decoded. Therefore, the minimum eavesdropping ca-
pacity Ce;j is reached when Pssse = (2Rdata 1)(Psddje+
1). Substituting Pssse = (2Rdata   1)(Psddje+1) into (10)
then gives the lower bound of Ce;j as
C
(low)
e;j = log2

1 +
pe
  (Psddje + 1)

; (24)
where  = 2Rdata   1.
Recall that the capacity for data transmission at the primary
destination PD is given by (8). Then substituting (8), (23) and
(24) into (13), and with the CR power constraints, we obtain
the lower and upper bounds of the secrecy capacity for the
primary network (corresponding to the jth jamming antenna)
as
C
(low)
s;j =
h
Cd   C(up)e;j
i+

h
log2

Ithppdje
(2Ith+1)pedjp
i+
;
(25)
C
(up)
s;j =
h
Cd   C(low)e;j
i+

h
log2

Ithppdje
(2Ith+1)pedjp
i+
;
(26)
respectively, where the approximation holds at the high SNR
which is often of interests in secrecy performance [18]. In
the following two subsections, we drive the upper and lower
bounds of the secrecy outage probability for Case 1 and 2
respectively.
A. Case 1 - with the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming
channel
The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 1 is shown in
(14).
1) Upper bound - Case 1: Noting that the jamming antenna
is selected among K2 antennas, and from (25), the lower
bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1 is obtained as
C(low; case 1)s =

log2

Ithpp
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1 ;K2

dje
djp
+
:
(27)
Then the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in
Case 1 is given by
P
(up; case 1)
s; out = P (C
(low; case 1)
s < Rsecrecy); (28)
where Rsecrecy is the target secrecy rate.
We let X = max
j=1 ;K2

dje
djp

, Y = pepp and Z = X=Y .
Further noting that the CDF of the division of two random
variables is given by (18), the CDF of X and PDF of Y can
be obtained as
FX(x) =

x
M + x
K2
and fY (y) =
L
(L+ y)2
; (29)
respectively, where M = de=dp and L = pe=pp.
The CDF of Z is then given by
FZ(z) =
Z 1
0
FX(zy)fY (y)dy: (30)
Substituting (29) into (30) gives (31) in the top of the next
page. We note that there is no uniform format of FZ(z) with
respect to the number of jamming antennas K2. But the closed
form expression can be obtained for any given K2, some of
which are shown in (31).
Finally from (28), the upper bound of the secrecy outage
probability of primary network is given by
P
(up; case 1)
s; out = FZ(u); (32)
where u = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith
.
2) Lower bound - Case 1: On the other hand, from (14)
and (26), the upper bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1
is obtained as
C(up; case 1)s =

log2

  Ithpp
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1 ;K2

dje
djp
+
:
(33)
Then the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability in
Case 1 is given by
P
(low; case 1)
s; out = P (C
(up; case 1)
s < Rsecrecy): (34)
Following the same procedures as those in obtaining (32), we
have
P
(low; case 1)
s; out = FZ(v); (35)
where v = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith , and FZ(:) is given by (32).
B. Case 2 - without the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming
channel
The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 2 is given by
(15).
1) Upper bound - Case 2: From (15) and (25), the lower
bound of the secrecy capacity is obtained as
C(low; case 2)s =

log2

Ithppdje
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp
+
:
(36)
The upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 2
is then given by
P
(up; case 2)
s; out = P (C
(low; case 2)
s < Rsecrecy): (37)
We let X2 = max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp

, Y2 =
pp
pe
and W1 = dje.
Using the order statistics, the CDF of X2 is obtained as
FX2(x2) = e
  K2dpx2 : (38)
The PDF-s of W1 and Y2 are given by
fY2(y2) =
1=L
(1=L+ y2)2
and fW1(w1) =
1
de
e
  w1de : (39)
respectively.
Further letting T1 = X2W1, the CDF of T1 is given by
FT1(t1) =
Z 1
0
FX2(t1=w1)fW1(w1)dw1 =
dpt1
deK2 + dpt1
:
(40)
6FZ(z) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Lz[Lz M M ln( zLM )]
(Lz M)2 ; if K2 = 1;
Lz[ L2z2+M2 2LMzln( zLM )]
(Lz M)3 ; if K2 = 2;
Lz[2L3z3+3L2Mz2 6LM2z+M3 2L2Mz2ln( zLM )]
2(Lz M)4 ; if K2 = 3;
Lz[12L5z5+65Mz4L4 120z3L3M2+60z2L2M3 20zLM4+3M5 60L4Mz4ln( zLM )]
12(Lz M)6 ; if K2 = 5;
   ;
(31)
Finally we let Q = T1Y2, and obtain the CDF of Q as
FQ(q) =
Z 1
0
FT1(q=y2)fY2(y2)dy2
=
Ldpq
h
dpqL K2de  K2deln

dpqL
K2de
i
(K2de   dpqL)2 :
(41)
Comparing (37) and (41), we then have
P
(up; case 2)
s; out = FQ(u)
=
Lu
h
 MK2 + uL MK2ln

uL
MK2
i
(MK2   uL)2 ;
(42)
where u = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith
, M and L are defined in (29).
2) Lower bound - Case 2: From (26) and (15), the upper
bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 2 is obtained as
C(up; case 2)s =

log2

  Ithppdje
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp
+
:
(43)
Then following the similar procedures as those in obtain-
ing (42), we obtain the lower bound of the secrecy outage
probability in Case 2 as
P
(low; case 2)
s; out = P (C
(up; case 2)
s < Rsecrecy) = FQ(v);
(44)
where v = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith .
V. ASYMPTOTICAL SECRECY PERFORMANCE
It is shown above that, in both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy
performance of the primary network depends on the ratio of
M = dedp , or a largerM results in better secrecy performance.
In fact, M to the secrecy outage probability is similar as the
SNR to the data transmission outage probability. Thus it is
of great interest to analyze the asymptotical secrecy perfor-
mance that is, when M ! 1, how the secrecy performance
varies with the number of jamming antenna K2. Similar to
the conventional data transmission, the asymptotical secrecy
performance includes the secrecy diversity order and coding
gain.
When M ! 1, the secondary source SS transmission
has little effect on the eavesdropping capacity so that the
secrecy outage probability is close to the upper bound. Thus
the secrecy diversity order and coding gain can be defined
based on the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability.
To be specific, the secrecy diversity order is defined as
ds =   lim
M!1
log10 P
(up)
s;out
log10M
: (45)
Similar to the classic diversity order, the secrecy diversity
order reflects the decreasing rate of the secrecy outage prob-
ability with respect to the antenna number K2.
On the other hand, the secrecy coding gain can be defined
as
cs = lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up)
s;out(K = Kb)
  lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up)
s;out(K = K2);
(46)
where P (up)s;out(K) is the secrecy outage probability if there are
K antenna available for jamming antennas selection, K2 is
the number of available jamming antennas, Kb is the number
of jamming antennas in the baseline system for comparison.
As will be shown below, we let Kb = 2 and Kb = 1 in
Case 1 and Case 2 respectively. It is clear from (46) that the
secrecy coding gain reflects the ‘shift’ of the secrecy outage
probability with respect to the antenna number K2.
A. Case 1 - with the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming
channel
From (31), and ignoring lower orders of M terms, we have
lim
M!1
P
(up; case 1)
s; out =

Lz  ln(M)M 1; if K2 = 1;
Lz
K2 1 M 1; if K2  2:
(47)
Substituting (47) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order in
Case 1. To be specific, if K2 = 1, the secrecy diversity order
is obtained as
d (case 1)s (K2 = 1) =   lim
M!1
log10(Lz  ln(M)M 1)
log10M
=   lim
M!1
log10(Lz)
log10M
  lim
M!1
log10(ln(M))
log10M
  lim
M!1
log10(M
 1)
log10M
= 1:
(48)
And if K2  2, the secrecy diversity order is given by
d (case 1)s (K2  2) =   lim
M!1
log10(
Lz
K2 1 M 1)
log10M
= 1
(49)
Combining (48) and (49), we obtain the secrecy diversity order
in Case 1 as
d (case 1)s = 1: (50)
7On the other hand, as is shown in (47),
limM!1 P
(up; case 1)
s; out has a uniform expression for K2  2.
Thus we let Kb = 2 in (46) as a baseline to define the secrecy
coding gain in Case 1 as
c(case 1)s = lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up; case 1)
s; out (K = 2)
  lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up; case 1)
s; out (K = K2):
(51)
Substituting (47) into (51) gives the secrecy coding gain in
Case 1 as
c(case 1)s = 10 log10(K2   1); for K2  2: (52)
B. Case 2 - without the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming
channel
From (42), and ignoring lower orders of M terms, the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability for Case 2 is given by
lim
M!1
P
(up; case 2)
s; out =
Lz
K2
 ln(M)M 1: (53)
Substituting (53) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order
in Case 2 as
d (case 2)s =   lim
M!1
log10(Lz=K2  ln(M)M 1)
log10M
= 1:
(54)
On the other hand, because (53) holds for any K2, we let
Kb = 1 in (46) as a baseline to define the secrecy coding gain
in Case 2 as
c(case 2)s = lim
M!1
10 logP
(up; case 2)
s; out (K = 1)
  lim
M!1
10 logP
(up; case 2)
s; out (K = K2):
(55)
Substituting (53) into (55) gives secrecy coding gain in Case
2 as
c(case 2)s = 10 log10(K2): (56)
C. Discussion
It is clear from (50) and (54) that, in both Case 1 and 2,
the secrecy diversity order is 1. Or the decreasing rate of the
secrecy outage probability with respect to M is always 1, no
matter how many transmission jamming antennas are used at
the secondary destination.
On the other hand, it is shown in (52) and (56) that,
with more transmission jamming antenna for selection at the
secondary destination, the secrecy outage performance still
improves due to the coding gain. It is interesting to note that
(52) and (56) are consistent, because they are defined based
on Kb = 2 and Kb = 1 as the baselines respectively.
Therefore, in both Case 1 and 2, the jamming antenna
selection at the secondary destination leads to the secrecy
coding gain, but not the diversity gain. This contrasts sharply
with the traditional antenna selection approaches for data
transmission, where the diversity order usually goes up with
the antenna number. The analysis also shows that, even without
the knowledge of the SD ! E jamming channel gains, the
secrecy performance still improves with the jamming antenna
selection.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide theoretical and simulation results
to verify the proposed dual antenna selection scheme in the
CR network. In the simulation, the CR network consists of one
pair of primary source PS and destination PD, and one pair
of secondary source SS and destination SD. Except for SD,
all nodes are equipped with a single antenna. While there are
multiple antennas at SD, the antenna numbers are respectively
set for different simulations. All channels are Rayleigh flat
fading and channel coefficients remains unchanged during
one time slot but vary independently from one time slot
to another. The average channel gains for different channel
groups, PS ! SDi, SS ! SDi, SDi ! E and SDj ! PD
respectively, can be different but the channels within each of
the above groups are i.i.d. For example, the average channel
gains for PS ! SD1;    ; PS ! SDM are the same, but
the average channel gains for PS ! SD1 and SS ! SD1
may be different. This describes a typical CR network, and
the different average channel gains for each group represent
different path-loss for every node at various locations within
the network. All simulation results are obtained by averaging
over 1,000,000 independent runs. Other parameters including
the data transmission rate and target secrecy rate are set
individually for every simulation.
Fig. 2 (a) and (b) show the secrecy outage probability of
the primary network vs target secrecy rate in Case 1 and 2
respectively, where we set the number of jamming antenna
as K2 = 5, the average channel gains as pp = 55 dB,
sp = pd = 20 dB, se = 10 dB, pe = 40 dB, de = 30 dB,
dp = 20 dB and dd = 1 dB, the interference constraint level
at the primary destination as Ith = 3 and the data transmission
rate at the secondary source SS as Rdata = 2 bps/Hz. Both
the simulation results and theoretical upper and lower bounds
are shown. It is clear that, in both cases, the simulation results
lie between the lower and upper bounds, which well verifies
the secrecy outage analysis for the primary network in Section
IV. Specifically, when the average SS ! E channel is small
(se = 5 dB) or large (se = 70 dB), the simulation results
are close to the upper bounds. This is because that, at the
eavesdropper, the signals from SS can be ignored when se
is small, or successfully decoded and subtracted from the
received signal when se is large. For other SS ! E channel
gains, the simulation results lie between the upper and lower
bounds. Comparing Fig. 2 (a) and (b) also reveals that Case 1
has better secrecy performance than Case 2. This is as expected
because Case 1 has the knowledge of the SD ! E jamming
channel and Case 2 does not.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probabilities vs M =
de=dp, where we set Ith = 1, the secrecy target rate as
Rst = 4 bps/Hz and the average gain ratio L = pe=pp =  5
dB. Fig. 3 verifies the following analsyis.
 In both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the
primary network improves with more jamming antennas.
 In both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity orders for all
jamming antenna numbers K2 are always 1, as are given
by (50) and (54) respectively. For example, for K2 = 5
in Case 1, when M increases from 40 to 50 dB, the
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Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probabilities for two cases vs M = de=dp (dB).
secrecy outage probability approximately drops from -37
to -47dB.
 In Case 1, the secrecy coding gain is 10 log10(K2   1),
as is given by (52). For example, for M = 50 dB, the
secrecy outage difference between K2 = 2 and K2 = 5
is about 6 dB, which well matches the theoretical coding
gain for K2 = 5 as 10 log2(5  1)  6 dB. Note that in
Case 1, the baseline system for coding gain definition is
based on K2 = 2.
 In Case 2, the secrecy coding gain is 10 log10(K2), as is
given by (56). For example, for M = 50 dB, the secrecy
outage difference between K2 = 5 and K2 = 1 is about
7 dB, which well matches the theoretical coding gain for
K2 = 5 as 10 log10(5)  7 dB. Note that in Case 1,
the baseline system for coding gain definition is based
on K2 = 1.
Thus Fig. 3 clearly shows that, in both Case 1 and 2, the
jamming antenna selection at the secondary destination leads
to coding gain rather than the diversity gain in the secrecy
outage probability.
Fig. 4 shows the outage probability for data transmission
in the secondary network vs N = sd=pd, where we set the
target data rate in the secondary network as Rt = 4 bps/Hz,
sp = pd = 20 dB, the power constraint level as Ith = 1
or 3. Both the simulation and theoretical results are presented,
which are shown perfectly match. It is clearly shown in Fig. 4
that, for both Ith = 1 and 3, the outage probability decreases
with more receiving antennas and the improvement is clearly
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Fig. 4. The outage probability vs N = sd=pd of the data
transmission in the secondary network.
from the diversity gain. This well verifies the analysis in
Section III that the antenna selection leads to the diversity
gain for the data transmission in the secondary network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed the dual antenna selection scheme
in the secure CR network. This was achieved by applying
full duplex transmission at the secondary user. The outage
probability for both the data transmission in the secondary
network and secrecy performance in the primary network were
analyzed, where the analysis showed that the antenna selection
leads to diversity gain for the secondary data transmission and
coding gain for the primary secrecy performance respectively.
Numerical simulation results were also shown to well verify
the analysis in this paper. Both the analysis and simulations
showed that the proposed scheme describes an attractive
scheme in the secure CR network.
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